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Inflation and the global economy 
In this speech,(1) Professor Tim Besley,(2) a member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),
discusses differences and similarities between inflation rates across industrialised economies.  Most
countries experienced high and volatile inflation during the 1970s and part of the 1980s, and low
and stable inflation thereafter.  Professor Besley argues that the main contrast between these two
periods is a significant change in central bank responses to inflation.  Periods of high and volatile
inflation were associated with negative real interest rates (ie the policy rate adjusted for inflation) in
nine industrialised economies, which can be interpreted as symptomatic of a relaxed monetary
policy.  The most recent period of low and stable inflation is characterised, in contrast, by positive
real rates of interest.  The experience of the past suggests that using monetary policy to support the
economy in the face of negative productivity shocks had little success.  Professor Besley concludes
that monetary policy cannot (and should not, therefore, try to) prevent warranted real economy
changes taking place but it can perhaps smooth some of the adjustment in response to the real
implications of the credit shock.  The MPC will do its best to keep businesses’ and households’
inflation expectations anchored around the 2% target.  This provides the best context to maintain
the credibility of the framework that we have in the United Kingdom and allows monetary policy to
play its part in maintaining the stability that is needed for households and businesses to plan for the
long term.
Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for coming.  
Had I been speaking here a year ago on the challenges faced by
the MPC, I would have emphasised the inflationary
implications of the robust expansion in the UK economy in the
face of mounting capacity pressures and some signs of a
pickup in global inflationary pressure.  You will recall that
April 2007 was the month in which, for the first time, the
Governor of the Bank of England was obliged, under the
accountability arrangements put in place by the 1997
framework, to write an open letter to the then Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, explaining why inflation had
risen to 3.1% in March, more than 1 percentage point away
from the target of 2%.  That letter underlined the
determination of the MPC to take whatever action would be
necessary to return inflation to target.  It also explained why
the MPC expected that inflation would fall back towards target
as increases in domestic energy prices, in particular, dropped
out of the base of the consumer prices index (CPI).  This
expectation was realised with inflation dipping a little below
the target at 1.9% in July of last year.
While the first open letter after a decade of the
post-independence period attracted a good deal of attention,
it is important to look at the period since writing the letter in a
wider context.  Looking back, there is little to suggest that this
period of above-target inflation led to second-round effects in
wages and prices that could constitute the beginning of an
inflationary spiral away from the target.  Nonetheless,
measures of inflation expectations, especially from surveys and
pricing intentions in surveys of businesses, have remained
elevated since that time.  
The main headline event since that period is, of course, the
financial market disruption that began last August and remains
with us today.  The far-reaching implications of this are still
being studied.  Managing its consequences presents a
significant challenge to policymakers around the world as its
effects filter through to businesses outside the financial sector
and to households, not least in the latter’s access to mortgage
finance.  This has created a rather different context for
monetary policy compared to a year ago when the inflationary
(1) Delivered at the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce, London on 22 April 2008.  This
speech can be found on the Bank’s website at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2008/speech343.pdf.
(2) I am grateful to Neil Meads and Paolo Surico for their help and insights in preparing
this speech, and colleagues for comments.  The views expressed are my own and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the
Monetary Policy Committee.
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pressures that led to the open letter were accompanied by a
robust picture for economic activity.  
However, in common with a year ago, the challenge of
responding to inflationary pressures remains.  Prior to the
publication of the February 2008 Inflation Report, I was struck
how the focus on the financial market turmoil had largely
deflected attention away from concerns about inflation.  The
MPC’s remit is to maintain price stability by targeting 2% CPI
inflation and, subject to that, to support the Government’s
economic objectives for growth and employment.  Given this,
we are obliged to remain firmly focused on the implications of
developments in the economy for inflation in the medium
term.  There is now widespread recognition of the fact that the
challenge for the MPC in setting interest rates is to try to
balance two significant risks to the UK economy — the
downside risk to demand and output which could eventually
drag inflation below the target and the risk that upside shocks
to energy and food prices lead to a more persistent period of
inflation above the 2% target that becomes embedded in
inflation expectations.
One striking feature of the inflationary pressure that we face in
the United Kingdom is how far this is being mirrored by the
experience in other countries.  Inflation in the euro zone is
3.6%, the highest since the inception of the euro.  In the
United States, it is 4.0%,(1) in China 8.3% and in India 7.8%.(2)
All are higher than a year ago.  The fact that all countries have
experienced increases in energy, food and other commodity
prices is a significant factor.  Wheat prices have risen from
US$4.50 per bushel to US$7.62 per bushel and oil from
US$65 per barrel to US$111 per barrel over the past twelve
months.(3) These, of course, reflect the strong global economic
performance in recent times — powered by the spectacular
performances by India and China whose average annual
growth rates have exceeded 8.5% and 10.2% respectively over
the past five years.  In short, the world does appear to have
become a more inflationary place of late.
Looking at these issues in a broader historical context, the
synchronous movement in inflation rates across industrialised
economies(4) is quite striking.  This can be seen in Chart 1, and
it has been the subject of a number of recent economic
analyses.(5) Many of you here will have lived through the early
part of the period in this chart — sometimes labelled the
‘Great Inflation’.  The chart illustrates just how similar inflation
rates have been across the industrialised world, with most
countries experiencing high and volatile inflation during the
1970s and part of the 1980s, and low and stable inflation
thereafter.  The cause of this moderation in inflation is much
debated.(6) In a nutshell, there are three main candidates:
good luck, structural economic change and good policy.
The suggestion that the moderation in inflation is down to
good luck argues that economies have not, in more recent
times, been subjected to too many inflationary cost shocks of
the kind that we saw, in particular, with the two oil price hikes
of 1973 and 1979.  This, so the story goes, has diminished the
challenges faced by policymakers charged with controlling
inflation.  
Given that the current pressure on inflation is so readily
attributed to food and energy price pressures, it is tempting to
believe that such movements are exceptional and that the
great moderation was a reflection of stable commodity prices.
In fact, this turns out to not be true as is illustrated in Chart 2
which shows little evidence of a reduction in volatility in
primary goods prices over either period.(7)
When I was first taught economics in the 1970s, it was
sometimes suggested that the oil price shocks of 1973 and
1979 caused the ‘Great Inflation’.  But it was soon realised that
this does not work as an explanation of inflation since these
shocks were sudden and temporary while the inflation that
they created was persistent.  Of course, some kinds of
commodity prices — notably oil — do generate temporary
fluctuations in inflation as they pass through to households.
But they cannot account, on their own, for persistent inflation.
Indeed, Chart 3 shows that, excluding the episodes of 1973
and 1979, oil price inflation and a measure of international
inflation are virtually uncorrelated.(8) So I think that we need
to look elsewhere to understand what drives the persistent
patterns in inflation seen in Chart 1.
(1) Headline CPI inflation for March 2008.
(2) Based on Indian wholesale price index.
(3) Number 2 soft red wheat and crude oil prices reported for 18 April 2008.
(4) I will focus here on the experiences of nine countries only:  Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
However, the arguments discussed here are relevant to most OECD economies.
(5) See for instance Rogoff (2003), Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005), Borio and Filardo (2007),
and Mumtaz and Surico (2008).
(6) The academic literature now uses the term the ‘Great Moderation’ to refer to the
decline in the volatility of output growth.  Here, I note that a similar decline occurred
in the level and volatility of inflation across most industrialised economies.
(7) See Walton (2006) for a discussion of why the UK economy may have become less
vulnerable to oil shocks.
(8) A similar result is reported by Mumtaz and Surico (2008).
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Chart 1 Inflation in nine industrialised countries
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One possibility is to look behind the causes of the current
increases in commodity prices — which are largely attributable
to the strength of the global economy, particularly the
integration into the world economy of China and India.
Perhaps bouts of inflation in the industrialised world are then
simply a reflection of global economic success.  Chart 4 looks
at this issue plotting the relationship between global economic
growth and international inflation in a sample of nine OECD
countries suggesting a negative relationship between the two.
Viewing this relationship as a structural feature of the global
economy is tempting, but there are at least a couple of reasons
to resist such a temptation.(1) First, in a world of floating
exchange rates, there is scope for exchange rates to adjust
across countries in response to domestic and foreign shocks.(2)
Second, the recent period of global growth has been
associated with an expansion in world trade that has reduced
the costs of many manufactured goods in particular.(3)
The structural change explanation for lower rates of inflation in
recent years puts weight on the idea that fundamental reforms
to product and labour markets, particularly in response to
increased competition due to trade openness, has increased
the flexibility of economies.  This, in turn, makes it less likely
that a given shock to costs or to demand results in inflationary
pressure.(4) While there is little doubt that some economies
are more flexible now than in the past, it is not at all obvious
that this should result in lower inflation even though there
may be many other beneficial consequences of increased
flexibility.  In particular, another feature of Chart 4 — the
observation that the rates of output growth in industrialised
economies have been considerably less volatile since the
mid-1980s — may well be attributable in part to increased
flexibility.
The third explanation for the more recent experience of low
inflation emphasises good policy.  This has also been discussed
extensively in the recent academic and policy literature.(5)
Before turning to this in detail, let me begin with the
observation that most, though not all, OECD countries appear
to have had somewhat similar policies in the two periods
documented in Chart 1.  To see this, it is useful to look at
Chart 5 which gives the short-term interest rate in a sample of
OECD countries.  The chart illustrates the proposition that
(1) Borio and Filardo (2007) construct measures of the global output gap and show that
these measures have some marginal predictive power for domestic inflation, over and
above measures of domestic slack, using data for a panel of OECD countries.
Ihrig et al (2007) assess the robustness of their results and provide evidence against
the hypothesis that globalisation has increased the relative role of international
factors in shaping the inflation process across eleven OECD countries.  See 
Mishkin (2007) for an overview of this debate.
(2) See Sentance (2007).
(3) See, for example, Pain et al (2007).
(4) See Bean (2006) for further discussion.
(5) See, for example, Rogoff (2006) and Cecchetti et al (2007).
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policies (in terms of central bank policy rates) have tended to
move together.
However, this observation tells us little on its own since the
challenges being faced by policymakers were similar too.  To
believe that policy played a role in the moderation of inflation,
one would need also to observe that the stance of policy was
similar across countries.  Chart 6 gives us one clue on this.  It
plots the real interest rate, ie the policy rate adjusted for
inflation, in nine countries over the period that I have been
discussing.  The message that I take away from this is that the
period of high and volatile inflation was associated with
negative real interest rates, which can be interpreted as
symptomatic of a relaxed monetary policy.  The most recent
period of low and stable inflation is characterised, in contrast,
by positive and higher real rates of interest.  
This observation is consistent with what sometimes is called
the Taylor principle — the notion that, in response to
inflationary pressures, a central bank that wishes to maintain
control over inflation needs to raise the nominal interest rate
enough to generate a positive real rate.  The fact that the
central bank is expected to conform to the Taylor principle
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Chart 5 Comovements in short-term interest rates
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Chart 6 Inflation and real interest rates
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contributes to managing the demand side of the economy and
keeps inflation expectations anchored around low inflation.
Furthermore, the experience of recent years suggests that once
credibility is established, inflation can be kept under control
through sequences of small changes of the policy rate in the
same direction.
This view that monetary policy matters argues that the main
contrast between the two broad periods of inflation
experience in Chart 1 can be attributed to a significant change
in central bank responses to inflation.  In the 1970s and 1980s
there were few central banks whose policy responses to
inflation provide a sufficient tightening of policy in the face of
inflation to anchor public beliefs around low and stable
inflation.  As is made clear by Chart 6, an exception to the
general picture was the Bundesbank which kept stable and
positive real interest rates over this period with the result that
German inflation remained low and stable even though it was
subject to the same international cost shocks as the other
countries in this chart.(1)
In the United States, monetary policy changed notably in the
1980s during Paul Volcker’s tenure as chairman of the Fed.  He
began the process of disinflation in the US economy which
initiated a fundamental change in the intellectual climate on
monetary policy thinking, leading ultimately to the adoption
of explicit inflation-targeting mandates in New Zealand
in 1990, Canada in 1991, the United Kingdom in 1992,
Sweden in 1995 and other countries thereafter (Chart 7).
But the constituency for low inflation was not built in a day.
It took some time for the low inflation norm, supported by
appropriate monetary policy, to become enshrined in
behaviour.  
During the period of low and stable inflation, monetary policy
in the United Kingdom has been focused on the control of
inflation, in line with the remit to maintain price stability.  But,
having been so successful in achieving this end, there is a
danger that monetary policy will be asked to do more.  In
particular, monetary policy makers may be expected to
protect the economy against persistent real shocks in the
mistaken view that adjustments in real living standards can be
avoided.  This is an important issue in the United Kingdom at
the present time when the economy is going through a period
of rebalancing away from consumption and towards closing
our current account deficit.  At the same time, we are adjusting
to the real implications of the credit shock.  Monetary policy
can perhaps smooth some of the adjustment in response to
changes in the real economy.  However, in my view, it cannot
(and should not, therefore, try to) prevent warranted real
economy changes taking place.
Given the immediacy of the present, it is always tempting to
think that the lessons of history offer little help to the
challenges that we face today.  But I think that there are two
main lessons worth thinking about in the current context.
First, this brief tour of history serves as a reminder that
inflation targeting was born of a practical recognition that
monetary policy can be used to manage inflation.  The
experience of the past suggests that using monetary policy to
support the economy in the face of negative real productivity
shocks had little success.  In many cases, central banks were
made independent and given their inflation-targeting remits to
avoid a repeat of these errors.  This affects the strategy of the
MPC in a subtle, but important, way.  In line with our remit,
monetary policy in the United Kingdom ought to remain
focused on achieving price stability as defined by the inflation
target.  Hence, we should avoid trying to offset downside
shocks to the real economy except insofar as they lead to
downside risks to inflation in the medium term.  The remit
does, however, give the MPC the scope to exercise its
judgement about the best way to influence the path of the
economy towards that objective.
Among the reasons that I welcome the initiative announced by
the Bank of England yesterday is that it is targeted directly at
alleviating a key stress that has followed from the current
disruption in financial markets.  This should allow the MPC to
stay more focused on its task of using monetary policy to
target inflation.
Second, there are challenges faced by the pressures that come
from the similarities and differences in the policy stances of
central banks around the world.  One of my earliest academic
papers was on the role of yardstick competition in shaping
public policy decisions.(2) The focus of that work was on the
observation that tax reforms (particularly increases in
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Chart 7 Inflation and monetary policy regimes
(a) Collapse of Bretton Woods (1973).
(b) Volcker appointment as Fed Chairman (1979).
(c) Volcker’s disinflation (1982).
(d) Inflation targeting adopted by Canada (1991).
(e) Inflation targeting adopted by the United Kingdom (1992).
(1) This argument comes from Mumtaz and Surico (2008).
(2) See Besley and Case (1995).
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taxation) appeared to be correlated across states in the
United States.  It turned out that Governors of US states did
not like to put up taxes unilaterally and there was an electoral
cost to them of doing so.  But if they put up taxes when
Governors in surrounding states were also putting up taxes,
then the electoral effect appeared muted.  The main lesson
from this strand of research is that particular domestic policies
can be accepted more easily by the public if they are adopted
also by countries that share a similar macroeconomic
performance.  The experience of the ‘Great Inflation’ of the
1970s as well as of the current credit crunch makes me only
too aware of real time yardstick competition when strategies
are being compared around the world.  But, in the face of this,
it is important to remain focused on implementing the policy
that is needed based on circumstances here in the
United Kingdom.
The MPC is now beginning its series of meetings leading up to
the publication of the May Inflation Report.  These meetings
provide a good opportunity for us to look in greater detail at
some aspects of the challenges that we currently face.  In
particular, it will be possible to process all the economic news
since February and to assess how it affects the balance of risks,
both upside and downside, to achieving the inflation target in
the medium term.  The arrangements that we now have in the
United Kingdom allow the MPC to do so reflectively and
independently, drawing on the considerable technical expertise
of the Bank of England’s staff.  Our inflation-targeting remit
anchors the discussions of the MPC so that we, in turn, can do
our best to keep businesses’ and households’ inflation
expectations anchored around the 2% target.  This provides
the best context to maintain the credibility of the framework
that we have in the United Kingdom and allows monetary
policy to play its part in maintaining the stability that is
needed for households and businesses to plan for the long
term.
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